The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, part of a consortium that includes a parallel center at the University of Michigan, was established in 1998 through a 5-year grant from the Social Security Administration. The goals of the Center are to promote research on retirement issues, to transmit new findings to the policy community and the public, to help train new scholars, and to broaden access to valuable data sources. Through these initiatives, the Center hopes to forge a strong link between the academic and policy communities around an issue of critical importance to the nation's future.
INTRODUCTION
One of these provisions would have marginally liberalized eligibility for disabled widow(er)s benefits by repealing the seven-year deadline for a surviving spouse to qualify for benefits on the basis of disability, a change estimated by the Congressional Budget Office as affecting 25,000 people in 2005 (March 12, 2002 . Although the H.R. 4069 provisions failed to be enacted when the Senate was unable to fast-track the passage of the bill under "unanimous consent" rules, it is the proposed liberalization of eligibility for disabled widow(er)s benefits (and these other provisions in H.R. 4069) are very likely to be taken up in the next legislative year.
Initially enacted in 1967 the disabled widow(er)s benefit now provides a permanently reduced cash benefit equal to 71 1/2 percent of the deceased spouse's primary insurance amount (PIA) to survivors ages 50 through 64 who do not have dependent children under age 16 1 and who meet Social Security eligibility criteria. These persons are eligible for Medicare benefits after a 24-month waiting period. In December, 2000 approximately 195,000 disabled widows and 5,000 disabled widowers receive a Disabled Widows Benefit with an average monthly benefit of $519.66 (Social Security Bulletin, 2001) . Among the most economically at risk Social Security beneficiaries, an estimated 37 percent of Disabled Widow(er)s have below-poverty incomes after benefit receipt (Walker, 1997) . Indeed, one of the concerns related to this benefit is that a vulnerable population of women is currently receiving a permanently reduced benefit wit h long-term implications for their well being in advanced middle and old age.
Clearly, the Disabled Widow(er)'s benefit is not the most important provision of the Social Security Act; neither is its reform the central Social Security policy issue of the day. But, this benefit has significant effects on the lives of those who are current or potential disabled widow(er) beneficiaries and, therefore, proposals to improve these benefits deserve serious attention by policy makers. Moreover, in the context of presidential and congressional interest in the adequacy problems of women beneficiaries, it is reasonable to explore whether changes in benefit amounts or eligibility criteria for Disabled Widow(er)s benefits might provide an efficient means of targeting to a relatively small and primarily female group, at substantial economic risk.
METHODS
To provide a basis for assessing the feasibility and appropriateness of further reforms of this benefit, this paper 1) analyzes the evolution of disabled widow(er)s benefits, 2) profiles current and potential disabled widow(er) beneficiaries and 3) assesses six proposals to liberalize eligibility and benefits for disabled widow(er)s benefits. These proposals include:
• Eliminating the seven-year deadline for a surviving spouse to qualify for benefits on the basis of disability, • Increasing the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit to 100 percent of the deceased spouse's PIA at age 65, • Eliminating the age 50 requirement making Disabled Widow (er)s benefits available to severely disabled widow (er)s of any age, • Increasing the Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit to pay 100 percent of the deceased spouse's PIA at any age, • Eliminating the 24 month Medicare Waiting Period, • Preserving Medicaid eligibility of disabled widow (er)s who become ineligible for SSI due to an increase in their benefits or because they have become eligible for a Disabled Widow (er)s benefit for the first time.
First, we draw upon government reports, legislative history, other policy documents and interviews with policy actors. In tracing the evolution of disabled widow(er)s benefits, we discuss the rationale behind the original legislation, subsequent amendments and policy proposals. We note that the evolution of this benefit fits the pattern of incremental reform that has structured the contemporary Social Security program. While support for benefit improvements related to disabled widows is based, in part, on recognition of and concern for economic risk borne by disabled widow(er)s, the evolution of this benefit highlights the importance of symbolism in the politics of Social Security. Seeking to strengthen this benefit, enables politicians to show support for the concerns of women, without placing significant pressure on Social Security financing. Moreover, inexpens ive liberalizations such as those discussed in this paper can, as one Senate aid put it (personal communication, November 20, 2002) , be the "spoonful of sugar" that helps the tough Social Security "medicine go down."
Second, we use published Social Security program data. As we will discuss, the published data show that the average benefit amounts received by disabled widows is substantially below that of like-aged nondisabled widows.
Third, we also use six years of Current Population Survey: March Annual Demographic
Files data (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) to develop a rough profile of the economic status of current and potential disabled widow(er)s. The structure of the CPS Survey imposes significant limitations on its utility with regard to our analysis. The CPS identifies Social Security beneficiaries, but it does not allow for the identification of type of beneficiary (e.g., retired worker, aged widow(er), disabled widow(er)). To develop a sample of persons roughly comparable to current and potentially eligible disabled widow(er)s, we apply the following criteria:
• Persons aged 50 to 59 are drawn into the sample. We excluded persons aged 60-64 because many would be eligible for aged widows benefits and there is no reasonable way to distinguish between those eligible as "disabled" as opposed to "aged" widow(er)s.
• Only widows are drawn into the sample. We thought this would be cleaner because there are relatively few disabled "widowers" (less than three percent of all persons receiving disabled widow(er)s benefits).
This yields a sample (n=2197) of widows aged 50-59. Next we create three sub-samples of widows -1) "disabled" widows who receive Social Security benefits and do not have children under the age of 19 2 (n=159), 2) "disabled" widows who do not receive Social Security benefits and do not have children under age 16 (n=132) and 3) all remaining like-aged widows who are not "disabled (n=1906)."
In the absence of information about the type of Social Security benefits widows are receiving, we define widows as disabled if they meet all three of the following selection criteria:
They reported that they 1) "have a health problem or disability which prevents work or limits the kind or amount of work;" 2) had not worked in the survey year, and 3) had not worked because of illness or disability. We then divide this group into "disabled" widows who report receipt of Social Security benefits (n=159) and those that do not (n=132). The remaining members of the larger sample are nondisabled widows (n=1906). We then comp are these three groups with respect to differences across race, Hispanic origin, Education, receipt of income, health insurance coverage and household poverty status.
The data allow us to make comparisons across categories. However, we are very cautious with regard to interpretation. There are several important limitations of the data and methods we employ. For example, among the persons we define as "disabled widows with Social Security," we do not have a basis for distinguishing between "disabled" widows who are receiving benefits as a disabled worker versus as a disabled widow. Similarly, among the persons we classify as "disabled widows without Social Security, we do not know the extent to which this population is or will be potentially eligible for any form or Social Security benefit.
We believe we have a sample which allows us to trace the broad outlines of these three groups, but one that lacks the precision we would have preferred.
Finally, our methods also include a systematic analysis of policy options agains t stated criteria. Noting that each policy option is consonant with the adequacy goals of Social Security, our analysis discusses trade-offs with regard to program costs and feasibility and notes potential unintended consequences.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF DISABLED WIDOW (ER)S BENEFITS
The enactment and modest expansion of disabled widow(er)s benefits conforms to a pattern of cautious, incremental change. Although reformers in the executive branch favored a somewhat more expansive bene fit, the congressional actors who shaped the enacting legislation sought to avoid substantial costs or other work disincentives. Hence, a very modest benefit was enacted in 1967, limited --as the original Disability Insurance program had been --to persons ages 50 or older. The modest liberalizations which have followed seem to be based on three understandings:
• that these benefits have been successfully implemented,
• that support for disabled widow(er)s has political and symbolic appeal • and that the cost of strengthening this benefit has been practically negligible. between the circumstances of an individual who chooses not to enter the work force after the death of their spouse and one who is unable to work due to a severe disability. In addition, the Committee proposed different definitions of disability, more restrictive than that used to classify a worker as disabled. Again, this was based upon concerns regarding the potential costs of the benefit along with a concern that the benefit might serve as a work disincentive (R. Ball, personal communications, 2001-2; Myers, personal communications, 2001-2) .
In its testimony before the Committee on Finance, the Social Security Administration indicated its support for removing the age-50 limitation proposed by the Ways and Means Committee and for payment of the full amount of the benefit, that is 82 ½ percent of the spouse's PIA. It also recommended that the test of disability be the same as that used to qualify the worker (Ball, 1967) . Contrary to the recommendations of the Senate Finance Committee and the Social Security Administration, in its final form, the Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit provided severely disabled widow(er)s under the age of 62 a permanently reduced cash benefit, scaled between 50 percent of the deceased workers PIA for those accepting the benefit at age 50 and 71 ½ percent of the PIA for those accepting benefits at age 60. In addition, beneficiaries would now qualify for health insurance protection under the Medicare program following a 24 month waiting period also prompted by cost concerns (R. Ball, personal communications, 2001-2) . In order to qualify for this benefit the widow (er) would have to meet a more restrictive test of disability than the worker and would require a showing of inability to engage in any gainful activity as opposed to any substantial gainful activity. Furthermore, while the Disability Insurance Program's test of disability allowed for consideration of vocational factors, the test of disability for disabled widow (er)s was based on medical evidence alone. In addition, the law specifies that the individual must have become disabled before the latest of seven years after the month their spouse died or seven years after the last month the beneficiary was previously entitled to benefits as a surviving spouse with child in care. In 1968, 21,563 disabled widow (er)s received this benefit, which increased to 129,833 disabled widow (er)s by 1979 (Social Security Administration, 2000).
Disabled Widow (er)s Benefits Changed 4 in 1983
The consensus and bipartisan report of the 1982-83 National Commission on Social Security Reform (a.k.a. Greenspan Commission) advanced four modest changes to the Social Security Act -all of which were enacted as part of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act -directed at improving benefits primarily affecting women. As a result of the Commission's recommendations and subsequent congressional action, the value of the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit was increased to 71 ½ percent of the PIA for those receiving benefits prior to age 60.
This change was applicable to both current and potential disabled widow (er)s benefit recipients .
At the time, the long-term 75-year cost of this change was estimated as being 0.01 percent of taxable payroll and the cost of increasing the benefit to 100 percent of the PIA was estimated as an additional 0.02 percent of taxable payroll. Additionally, the Commission recommended the continuation of benefits for remarried disabled surviving spouses aged 50-59, and remarried disabled divorced surviving spouses aged 50-59. While the costs to the social security trust fund were negligible, these changes were not unimportant to most of the estimated 111,591 individuals receiving a Disabled Widow (er) s benefit in 1983 (Social Security Administration, 2000).
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
The most recent change to the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit was included in the 
Other Ideas for Reform of the Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit
Beginning in 1985, various proposals for liberalization of the disabled widow (er)s benefit have been put forth. In February of 1985 the Subcommittee on Social Security published a report on earnings sharing which included a proposal to increasing the benefit amount to pay 100 percent of the deceased worker's PIA to a disabled widow (er) at any age (H. Rep. No. 99-4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985) . The Subcommittee's rationale for this liberalization included the fact that disabled widow(er)s under age 50 are basically in the same circumstances as disabled widows and widowers prior to the 1968 Social Security Amendments (H. Rep. No. 99-4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985) . Specifically, they are unable to wo rk and have no social security protections. In addition, as a result of their disability in combination with the early death of their spouse, they were likely to have less of an opportunity to accumulate savings in order to provide for their future. Furthermore, disabled widow (er)s may in fact be unfairly treated as they must accept a permanently reduced benefit at no fault of their own. Unlike aged widow (er)s, disabled widow (er)s do not have the option to work in order to avoid a permanent reduction in their social security benefit. The long-range net cost of this option was estimated to be 0.01 percent of taxable payroll (H. Rep. No. 99-4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985) . bill included a provision to extend the benefits to disabled widow(er)s regardless of age and specified that remarriage prior to age 50 would terminate the former spouse's eligibility. In addition, it proposes elimination of the 7-year rule. The cost of extending the benefit to surviving spouses at any age was estimated to be negligible (i.e., less than 0.005% of taxable payroll) (Goss & Wade, 2001 ). The cost of eliminating the 7-year rule was also estimated to be negligible (i.e., less than 0.005% of taxable payroll) (Goss & Wade, 2001) . While the rationale for these changes is not specifically mentioned, it is assumed that the successful implementation of these benefits and support for disabled widow(er)s has political and symbolic appeal. In addition the fact that the cost of strengthening this benefit has been practically negligible, further supports the appeal of these small, yet meaningful reforms. The data presented in table 3 and 4 present comparisons between three groups of widows who do not have children under the age of 19 -"disabled" widows who receive Social Security benefits, "disabled" widows who do not and nondisabled widows. As noted, we are cautious in drawing too many conclusions from these data. However, the data suggest that compared to the nondisabled group, both groups defining themselves as disabled have substantially lower levels of educational attainment, substantially higher levels of household poverty and economic need, substantially less private health insurance coverage and greater participation publicly-funded health programs. About three-fourths of the households in which nondisabled widows reside have incomes equal to or greater than 150 percent of the poverty line compared to a little more than one-quarter of the households with disabled widows who receive Social Security benefits and only one-tenth of the disabled widows households who do not receive benefits. Roughly similar proportional difference exist with regard to private health insurance coverage.
The data presented in tables 3 and 4 suggest that the majority of the households with disabled widows -both those receiving and not receiving Social Security benefits -experience significant economic hardships. One half of the those households receiving Social Security and three-fourths of those that do not have household incomes below the poverty threshold! Together, the data presented in these four tables provide very strong evidence of economic need among disabled widow beneficiaries.
ASSESSMENT OF DISABLED WIDOWS BENEFIT REFORM OPTIONS
We now turn our attention to an assessment of seven options -the six previously identified plus the option to take no action. We examine these options with regard to their adequacy, cost and feasibility. In discussing each of the options, we address the fo llowing questions:
• Does the recommendation enhance the financial security of current and potential beneficiaries and target to those at greatest risk? • How costly is the option?
• How administratively feasible is the option?
• Are there unintended consequences? Work disincentives? Interactions with other benefits?
Option 1: Do nothing.
• Pro: This option is administratively feasible and initially cost-effective as it would require no immediate financial investment or costs to the trust fund.
Con: Currently, 200,000 disabled widow (er)s, 195,000 widows and 5,000 disabled widowers receive a Disabled Widow (er)s benefit, with an average monthly benefit of only $519.66 (Social Security Administration). These individuals are forced to accept a permanently reduced social security benefit because they are disabled. They are not in the same situation as the aged widow as they do not have a choice to work in order to supplement their income as they are unable to work due to a severe disability. Therefore it appears that the status quo treats disabled widow (er)s unfairly. In addition, disabled widow (er)s under age 50 are currently in the same circumstance as disabled widows aged 50 -59 prior to the inclusion of disabled widows benefits within the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act. Specifically, they are unable to work due to a severe disability and have no social security protections. Furthermore, it seems that treatment of this population is less equitable than it is to disabled widow (er)s age 50 -59, let alone aged widows, as it is probable that their disability, in combination with the early death of their spouse, has made it extremely difficult for them to acquire savings in order to prepare for their future. Additionally, while doing nothing may be initially costeffective, one must consider the potential costs should these individuals become eligible for Supplemental Social Insurance (SSI). Again, the status quo appears to perpetuate the unfair treatment of a socially and economically vulnerable population which could potentially have extensive long term cost. introduced bills which proposed elimination of the age 50 requirement. In addition, the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, OWL and NOW also supports this reform.
• Pro: This option is administratively feasible, as all the systems for distribution of this benefit are in place. In addition extending the benefit to all disabled widow (er)s regardless of age would have negligible long-range costs (i.e. 0.005 percent of taxable payroll) (Goss & Wade, 2001) . Furthermore, there are potential cost savings as eligibility for this benefit may serve to decrease the SSI rolls once individuals formerly eligible for SSI become eligible to receive a Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit. Finally, since disabled widow (er)s under age 50 are in basically the same circumstances as disabled widow (er)s prior to the 1968 amendments and in fact may have greater financial needs than aged widows, this option would serve to address the unfair treatment of this vulnerable population.
• Con: This option might serve as a work disincentive although there appears to be no documented evidence to show that past liberalization of this benefit has had this effect. In additio n, while there may be some off-setting cost savings associated with a potential decrease in the SSI rolls due to liberalization of the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit, loss of SSI eligibility may mean that newly eligible disabled widow (er)s could lose their entitlement to Medicaid whose value is greater than the value of Medicare. In fact, Senator Riegle sought to this concern in S. 1872 through his proposal to amend the SSI program to preserve Medicaid eligibility of disabled widow (er)s who become ineligible for SSI due to an increase in their benefits or because they have become eligible for a Disabled Widow (er)s benefit for the first time. In addition, certain states such as South Dakota, Alabama and Vermont have addressed this concern by implementing supplemental health insurance programs for disabled widow (er)s who become ineligible for SSI due to receipt of a Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit. Unfortunately, without Federal guidelines, states will handle this issue differently resulting in the unequal treatment of disabled widow (er)s.
Option 3: Elimination of the seven-year deadline for a surviving spouse to qualify for benefits on the basis of disability.
As originally enacted in 1968, the Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit required that an individual must become disabled within seven years of the death of their spouse or seven years after the last month they were eligible to receive a benefit as a surviving spouse with child in care. The seven-year limit was initially enacted in order to provide ample opportunity for the surviving spouse to acquire enough working quarters to qualify for his or her own disability benefit (H. Rep. No. 544 • Pro: This option would allow previous ly ineligible disabled widow (er)s to become eligible for this vital benefit. In addition, this option is administratively feasible, as all the systems for distribution of this benefit are in place. Finally, this option is financially feasible as it is estimated to have a negligible cost (i.e., less than 0.0005 percent of taxable payroll) (Goss & Wade, 2001 ).
• Con: Again, while no evidence exists to support the notion that liberalization of this benefit might serve as a work disincentive, some may view this as a potential concern.
Option 4: Increase the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit to 100 percent of the deceased spouse's PIA at age 65
As originally enacted in 1968, the benefit provided severely disabled widows and dependent widowers under the age of 62 a permanently reduced cash benefit, scaled between 50 percent of the deceased workers PIA for those accepting the benefit at age 50 and 71 ½ percent of the PIA for those accepting benefits at age 60. As discussed above, the rationale for implementation of a reduced benefit was based in a cost concern 101 st Cong., 2d Sess., 1990; R. s, personal communication, 2001-2) as well as a belief that disabled widows should not be paid a higher benefit than aged widows (R. Myers, personal communications, 2001-2) . The consensus and bipartisan report of the 1982-83 National
Commission on Social Security Reform (a.k.a. Greenspan Commission) advanced four modest changes to the Social Security Act -all of which were enacted as part of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act -directed at improving benefits primarily affecting women. As a result of the Commission's recommendations and subsequent congressional action, the value of the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit was increased to 71 ½ percent of the PIA for those receiving benefits prior to age 60. At the time, the long-term 75-year cost of this change was estimated as being 0.01 percent of taxable payroll and the cost of increasing the benefit to 100 percent of the PIA was estimated as an additiona l 0.02 percent of taxable payroll.
• Pro: This option would provide disabled widow (er)s with an opportunity to receive the same benefit as an aged widow at age 65 essentially alleviating current circumstances which penalize a disabled widow (er) by giving him or her no choice but to receive a permanently reduced benefit solely based upon the fact that they are disabled. This option would be financially and administratively feasible as estimates have shown the costs of increasing the benefit amount to 100 percent of the deceased spouse's PIA at any age to be negligible (i.e., less than 0.01 percent of taxable payroll) (H.Rep. No. 99-4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985) .
• Con: This option does not address the needs of the 200,000 disabled widow (er)s currently receiving a permanently reduced Disabled Widow (er)s benefit. In addition, this option does not address the needs of disabled widow (er)s under the age of 50.
Option 5: Increase the Disabled Widow (er)s Benefit to pay 100 percent of the deceased spouse's PIA at any age
As discussed above, the rationale for implementation of a reduced benefit was based in a cost concern (H. Rep. No. 101-964, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess.,1990; R. Myers, personal communications, 2001-2) as well as a belief that disabled widows sho uld not be paid a higher benefit than aged widows (Myers, 2001-2) . In 1990 The House and the Senate acknowledged that the Disabled Widow (er)s benefit had not been found to be a significant cost to the Social Security trust fund (H. Rep. No. 101-964, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess.,1990) . In addition, successful incremental liberalization of this benefit has continued to produce minimal costs to the trust fund, making further liberalization of this benefit appealing. • Pro: This option would address issues of fairness and adequacy as it related to disabled widow (er)s of all ages. It would provide higher benefits for many disabled widow (er)s who get lower monthly benefits than do aged widows (non-disabled widows receive an average benefit of $814.18 whereas disabled widows receive an average monthly benefit of $519.66. It would permit disabled widow (er)s to be treated like other disabled people in terms of their social security benefit. In addition the long-range costs would be minimal (estimated to be 0.01 percent of taxable payroll) (H. Rep. No. 99-4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985) . This option is also administratively feasible as all the systems for distribution of this benefit are in place.
• Con: Again, while there appears to be no evidence to show that liberalization of this benefit has created work disincentives, some may find this to be a concern. In addition, as previously mentioned, potential loss of SSI eligibility may mean that newly eligible disabled widow (er)s could lose their entitlement to Medicaid whose value is greater than Medicare. • Pro: Elimination of the 24-month waiting period would provide vital health insurance coverage to disabled individuals including disabled widow (er)s who are unable to gain health insurance coverage through a previous employer. This option is administratively feasible as all systems for distribution of this benefit are in place.
• Con: This option could have greater than negligible long-term costs to the Medicare Program. This option does not address the inadequacies associated with the potential loss of Medicaid benefits for those disabled widow (er)s who prior to the onset of their disability, were eligible for SSI and Medicaid benefits. • Pro: This option would serve to create consistency across states by preserving Medicaid eligibility of disabled widow (er)s who lose their Medicaid benefit due to receipt of a Disable Widow (er)s Benefit or an increase in their benefit. Essentially this option would serve to remove an unintended penalization of poor disabled widow (er)s.
• Con: This option would likely be very costly as the Medicaid Program provides coverage for many more services than the Medicare Program. In addition, there would be costs associated with the receipt of Medicaid during the 24-month waiting period during which time there would have otherwise been no costs to the system.
CONCLUSION
As a group, current and potential disabled widow beneficiaries experience significant economic risks. There is much to suggest a need for policymakers to take a careful look at this relatively small group who, by turning to the Social Security program for support early in their lives, are consigned to a very low standard of living for their remaining years.
Policymakers of both parties seem to have little resistance to marginal improvements in this area. It presents a rare opportunity to make small, but meaningful improvement, in a benefit that primarily targets to women. Given the scope of problems besetting the politics of Social Security, substantial reform in this area (e.g., eliminating the 24 month waiting period) seems unlikely. Still, modest, low-cost reforms can benefit some among this at-risk population and are worth pursuing. [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] 
